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 The legitimity of the one-party regimes in Soviet type societies was based 
on the guarantee of providing social security to all members of the society. As 
the result of the collapse of these regimes, the population of postcommunist 
countries was seized by the fear of pauperization, ruthless capitalist 
exploitation, anomie, moral degradation, crime rise, etc. It has tried to find 
rescue from this fear in the warm bosom of ethnic groups. 
 The devastating consequences of postcommunist ethnic nationalisms suggest 
that the citizens of postcommunist countries need other cultural, normative and 
institutional orientations as the bases of their self-respect and self-confidence. 
This need can be satisfied in various types of communities. 
 The article summarizes the communitarian arguments in tavor of this 
thesis. Since, according to these arguments, belonging to a community is a 
sine qua non of the very morality and dignity of man, modern liberal-
democratic societies have to be understood as communities of communities. In 
order to guarantee the cohesion of these societies, procedural rules have to be 
supplemented by a number of substantive core values. 
 The understanding of modern political societies has a far-reaching impact 
upon the idea of civil society: its increased complexity and fragmentation, 
mediated interactions between citizens and the state, public sphere as the 
medium of discussions among communities — especially about their universalist 
claims and the “politics of difference”, etc. 
 Proceeding from this argumentation, some elements of the optium type of 
civil society for the postcommunist countries in Europe are proposed: A broad 
spectrum of communities and associations, deliberations upon the criteria of 
priority concerning their promotion, high respect for the liberal and democratic 
constitution, equality of all citizens, rule of law, welfare etc. These elements 
promise to promote a society in which free citizens constitute a “we” including 
all of them, enabling them to peacefully live and act within their respective 
associations and communities. 
 
 1) One of the bedrocks of legitimacy of the one party regimes in So-
viet type societies was the guarantee of social security to all members of 
the society. The historical project of building the socialist society and the 
centrally planned economy required that every member of the society be 
professionally educated and given an adequate job. Because everybody was 
included in the economic plan, job security was extremely high. By the 
same token, the whole population had health and pension insurance. Of 
course, due to the lack of market pressure, a large fraction of the labor 
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force was underworked, and salaries were correspondingly low. But this 
hardly reduced the social security. Moreover, many were able to find sec-
ond jobs in the grey economy and thus improve their standard of living. 
After all, there is the well-known “socialist” slogan “Nobody can pay me 
as little as I can work”. 
 In Yugoslavia the situation was slightly different. In the 1950s central 
planning was replaced by self-management and some market mechanisms, 
were introduced leading to considerable unemployment. However, self-man-
agement enabled the employed to avoid layoffs. The victims of unem-
ployment were primarily young and professionally educated people, who for 
years remained dependent on their families. But despite this anomalous 
situation, social security in Yugoslavia was not substantially lower than that 
in other communist countries: the oldies had their jobs, the youngsters 
their parents. 
 
 2) The 1980s can be considered as the decade of the collapse of 
communism. During this decade people in Soviet type societies (including 
Yugoslavia) were confronted with the threats of anarchy and ruthless capi-
talist competition and exploitation. Gone was the job security, and in 
many cases also the job and regular monthly income. Gone was the social 
infrastructure guaranteeing regular education, health care and old-age pen-
sions. Also gone was the Marxist-Leninist promise that the whole society 
was on its way towards a “bright future”. And finally, gone was the ruling 
party, the political organisation in charge of the whole society, ruling pa-
ternalistically, displaying daily the same well-known faces of party-leaders, 
repeating ad nauseam the same ideological phrases, thereby suggesting sta-
bility and historical continuity. 
 As a result of this collapse, numerous plagues afflicted the population: 
the fear of pauperisation and pauperisation itself, uncertainty about the 
future, fear of ruthless capitalist exploitation, anomie, moral degradation, 
crime rise, and many others. 
 
 3) In what direction could the plagued population look for a rescue? 
Of course, many people yearned for a western-style standard of living. 
But, essentially, only a tiny minority understood how western economies 
and societies work. The ruling communists, by pursuing their aim of a 
comprehensive cultural revolution and the creation of a “new man”, had 
destroyed most of the older cultural traditions. Thus, people had to cul-
turally cope with overwhelming fears while having at their disposal only 
several tiny, deformed and incongruous fragments of pre-communist tradi-
tions. In many cases they found only one use of these rather poor assets: 
the ideology of ethnic nationalism. 
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 The advantages of ethnic nationalism as an antidote against postcom-
munist fears and anomie are quite obvious, whereas its drawbacks often 
become visible only when it is too late: 
 a. Ethnic nationalism holds out the prospect of solidarity and security 
within the ethnic group. 
 b. The “ethnic identity” can be voluntarily construed from any tradi-
tional or contemporary cultural fragments and artefacts, environmental em-
beddedness and biological determinants of the group, etc. 
 c. Moreover, if an “ethnic identity” is based on biological factors, the 
membership in the ethnic group appears to be unchangeable. 
 d. The group can declare itself to be a “nation” and claim a separate 
nation-state — a claim legitimised by the internationally recognised “right 
to self-determination”. Living in such a state seems to promise additional 
security: its presumably unlimited “sovereignty” seems to guarantee protec-
tion against intervention, exploitation etc. by other states and ethnic 
groups. 
 e. However, ethnic nationalism does not offer the population any moral 
frame. It does not unite the community by offering it a social good, a set 
of moral values and norms, etc., but declares the ethnic collective and its 
nation-state itself to be the ultimate value — however badly defined that 
five and however repulsive its state might be.1 
 In particular, ethnic nationalism postulates the pre-eminence of 
“patriotism”, i.e. it locates every morally relevant phenomenon along a pa-
triotic/nonpatriotic moral axis. The most important elements of such patri-
otism are the willingness to waive one's individual rights in favor of the 
ethnic-national collective, to accept the autocratic, frequently fascist and 
even mafia-like rule of nationalist elites, and to recognize the preponder-
ance of statehood2. 
 f. Consequently, ethnic nationalism provides no moral norms ensuring 
domestic and external peace, but stimulates ethnic conflicts. civil and inter-
state wars. The most notorious example of such war, the Third Balkan 
war (between 1991 and 1995), has been misused for isolating the new 
states from Europe and for bending the scared and impoverished popula-
tion to the will of the new strongmen in order to pillage it. 
 
 1Ethnic nationalisms are often given metaphysical foundations, in most cases 
incompatible with their characters. Such foundations contradict their biologistic 
dimensions which are universalistic, whereas ethnic nationalisms are particularistic 
and provincial. Metaphysical assumptions presuppose elaborated theological theories, 
whereas ethnic nationalisms are theoretically helpless. In other words, the 
metaphysical foundations serve only as decorations of the incoherent folkloristic 
pictures of most ethnic identities. 
 2In the political jargon of post-Yugoslav ethnic nationalisms: “dr`avotvornost”. 
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 4) The incoherence and retrograde character of ethnic/national identities 
and the barbarism of the postcommunist ethnic wars suggest that the citi-
zens of postcommunist countries need other cultural ideological and insti-
tutional foundations for their ideological and normative orientations as 
bases for their self-respect and self-confidence. 
 Obviously, one of these foundations is a modern, liberal-democratic 
constitution, guaranteeing human rights and liberties, and democratic politi-
cal participation to every citizen. However, to the constituencies which are 
the victims of postcommunist anomie and which lack civic political culture, 
such a constitution alone does not offer the badly needed ideological ori-
entation and the embeddedness in a solidary community as the functional 
replacement for the ideological and social security they enjoyed in 
communism.  
 Therefore, the central thesis of this paper is that the best way to re-
duce the virulence of postcommunist ethnic nationalisms by reducing the 
anomie, fear and apathy of the citizens is to promote various types of 
communities. The generally accepted name of this normative orientation in 
political philosophy is communitarianism. 
 
 5) The basic thrust of communitarian critique is to show that liberalism 
and libertarianism, in connection with modern mobility and global eco-
nomic competition, are conducive to atomism3. Atomism thinks of humans 
as individuals able to think, act, and even exist independently of social 
ties and dependencies, i.e. as “unencumbered selves”, and uses this con-
ception as a theoretical premise of political philosophy. Correspondingly, 
political theories constructed on this premise grant priority to individuals, 
considering them as able to define their needs and choose their goals and 
life plans independently of the social context into which they grew and in 
which they live. They understand the constitution of the society as the re-
sult of a “social contract” among its potential individual members. These 
join the contract because they expect some individual advantages from it, 
i.e. advantages having the character of individually ascribable goods.  
 The paradigm of atomistic thinking is the idea of human rights. These 
rights are traditionally understood as “natural”, because they are supposed 
to pertain to each individual, whether they are members of a society, or 
still in a pre-social “natural state”. According to Charles Taylor, the pri-
 
 3Cf. Charles Taylor, Atomism, in: A. Kontos (ed.), Powers., Possessions and 
Freedom. Essays in Honour of C. B. Macpherson, Univ. of Toronto Press, Toronto 
1979; also in: C. T., Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Philosophical Papers 2, 
Cambridge UP, Cambridge 1985, pp. 187—210; C. T., Irreducibly Social Goods, in: 
Geoffrey Brennan, Cliff Walsh (eds.), Rationality, Individualism and Public Policy, 
Australian National University, Canberra 1990; also in: C. T., Philosophical 
Arguments, Harvard UP, Cambridge Mass. 1995, pp. 127—145. 
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ority of human rights is justifiable only if individuals are understood as 
self-sufficient, i.e. as potentially “unencumbered selves”. 
 
 6) In contrast to the numerous atomistic thinkers, communitarian phi-
losophers stress the insurmountable, existential embeddedness of every 
individual in society, i.e. in various social groups — families, tribes, neigh-
borhoods, villages, cities, religious communities or communes, civic associa-
tions, revolutionary cells, scientific communities, states, etc. Therefore the 
idea of an “unencumbered self” makes no sense. The most important 
ideas of communitarianism are the following: 
 a. According to the Bible, on the sixth day of Creation God created 
humans, males and females, “in the image of God”4, i.e. as equals and as 
holy. And he created the woman because he saw that “It is not good for 
man to be alone”5. And the man recognized the woman as “bone of my 
bone, flesh of my flesh”6. In other words, humans need each other, they 
prosper best in close relationships and stable solidary associations. Only in 
such associations — based upon a covenant, a moral bond of love and 
identity, and not on contract — can they develop their capabilities and 
conduct a satisfactory life7. 
 b. Atomistic thinkers believe that all goods can be reduced to goods 
for single individuals. In contrast, communitarian thinkers distinguish three 
categories of goods: (1) Goods supplied to single individuals, such as 
clothing and health care. (2) Goods supplied to collectives, but which 
could mutatis mutandis also be supplied to individuals. Such a collective 
good is, for instance, a dam protecting a settlement from floods: Every 
inhabitant of the settlement could get such a protection by building a dam 
around his house only, were there not the obvious disadvantages of such 
an individualistic approach. (3) Irreducibly social goods, i.e. goods that 
cannot be related only to single individuals. 
 Conspicuous irreducibly social goods are human thinking and speech. 
They depend on a socially recognized context of meanings, grammatical 
rules, conditions of validity of statements etc. The broader context of any 
meaningful speech is the whole culture of the group to which the speaker 
belongs. In Taylor's words, thoughts and utterances are not “plain events”, 
i.e. events which do not presuppose a background of meaning. They are 
“meaning events”, because they owe their meaning to the semiotic back-
 
 4Gen. 1, 26—27. 
 5Gen. 2, 12. 
 6Gen. 2, 23. 
 7Cf. Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, Rebuilding Civil Society: A Biblical Perspective, The 
Responsive Community, Vol. 7, No. 1, Winter 1996/97, pp. 11—20. 
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ground pertaining to a linguistic community. In fact, the relation between 
the background and speech acts is two-way: Not only do speech acts ob-
tain their meaning from the background, they also permanently recreate 
and modify the background. A good of this kind obviously cannot be 
subdivided into parts pertaining to single individuals8. 
 Numerous other goods are two-dimensional in the sense that one of 
their dimensions is irreducibly social, i.e. dependent on the cultural con-
text.  For instance, social statuses, roles, laws etc. are valid/meaningful due 
to the  social context of practices and institutions shaping the life of the 
respective  society, which may be a republic, another irreducibly social 
good9. Thus, the irreducibly social dimension of a good can be recognized 
by two of its properties: first, its status of good depends on the cultural 
context, and second, this dependence is generally recognized. Obviously, 
the cultural context bestowing meaning upon irreducibly social goods is it-
self such a good10. 
 c. Communities, irreducibly social goods and their semiotic/cultural con-
texts are immutably and intrinsically interdependent. Someone who, by free 
choice or as a result of spontaneous enculturation, shares into a set of 
meanings, valuations, cultural practices, and other irreducibly social goods, 
belongs to the community based on and upholding these meanings, evalua-
tions, practices, and goods. The culture of the community bestows mean-
ings upon his convictions, practices, and actions. Reversely, by recognizing 
these meanings, keeping his convictions and continuing his. practices, he 
stabilizes and perpetuates his community. 
 For example, someone who has been baptised in a Catholic church, 
believes in the Holy Trinity, regularly attends the masses, lives in accor-
dance with the Catholic religious tenets, respects the Pope, etc., belongs to 
the community of Catholics. If they give up on all this, declare themselves 
atheists, and break away from the Church, they cease to belong to that 
community. 
 
 8Cf. Charles Taylor, Irreducibly Social Goods, in: Geoffrey Brennan, Cliff Walsh 
(eds.), Rationality, Individualism and Public Policy, Australian National University, 
Canberra 1990; also in: C. T., Philosophical Arguments, Harvard UP, Cambridge 
Mass. 1995, pp. 127—145; C. T., Social Theory as Practice, in: C. T., Social 
Theory as Practice, The B. N. Ganguli Memorial Lectures 1981, Oxford UP, Delhi 
1983; also in: C. T., Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Philosophical Papers 2, 
Cambridge UP, Cambridge 1985, pp. 91—115; Charles Taylor, Cross-Purposes: The 
Liberal-Communitarian Debate, in: Nancy L. Rosenblum (ed.), Liberalism and the 
Moral Life, Harvard UP, Cambridge 1989, pp. 159—182; also in: C. T., 
Philosophical Arguments, Harvard UP, Cambridge Mass. 1995, pp. 181—203. 
 9C. Taylor, Social Theory as Practice, p. 96; idem, Irreducibly Social Goods, p. 
135; idem, Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate. 
 10Cf. C. Taylor, Irreducibly Social Goods, passim. 
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 However, such withdrawal may, for all practical purposes, be impossible 
in the case of a tribe — a community based on kinship, specific beliefs 
and rituals permeating all spheres of life, a particular language etc. On 
the one hand, bonds of kinship are inalterable. On the other hand, adults 
enculturated into their tribe may be unable to learn a foreign language 
and to reconstruct their beliefs, system of values, habits etc. And the 
members of other, similarly constituted communities might find it virtually 
impossible to accept the apostate. Thus, leaving the tribe may be synony-
mous with cultural suicide. 
 d. Community cultures are bases of evaluations. Each culture contains a 
number of contrasting concepts (e. g., subjective/objective, rational/irrational, 
democratic/totalitarian, tolerant/dogmatic etc.) defining the descriptive and 
evaluative axes along which single objects, events, processes etc. can be 
positioned and thus integrated into the respective culture. 1.e., these axes 
define the cognitive and the moral map of the culture11. 
 The moral map of a community enables its members to define their 
moral — axiological, normative — positions within the community, pro-
ceeding from their individual needs and desires. Charles Taylor distin-
guishes first- and second-order desires. The former are objects of the lat-
ter. Both categories of desires are under the scrutiny of two categories of 
evaluations. The weighing of first-order desires Taylor calls “weak evalua-
tion”. The objective of weak evaluations is to optimize the results of ac-
tions in order to maximize total satisfaction.  
 By referring to first-order desires, second-order desires can categorize 
them according to morally relevant motives, e. g. according to moral di-
chotomies like higher/lower, virtuous/vicious, profound/superficial, noble/base, 
etc., and as belonging to qualitatively different modes of life described by 
dichotomies like fragmented/integrated, alienated/free, saintly/merely human 
ate. Taylor calls the corresponding moral evaluations “strong evaluations”. 
Due to the strong evaluations, first-order desires can be rejected if they 
are considered immoral12. 
 e. Strong evaluations do not refer only to their explicit objects. They 
are simultaneously moral self-definitions of the evaluating person. By char-
acterizing the first-order need of a person to, for instance, help people in 
trouble as noble, and by strongly evaluating nobility as preferable to base-
ness, a person not only expresses her moral view of the helpful person, 
 
 11Cf. e. g. Hartmut Rosa, Cultural Relativism and Social Criticism from a 
Taylorian Perspective, Constellations, Vol. 3, No. 1, April 1, 1996, pp. 39—60, 
passim. 
 12Cf. Charles Taylor, What is Human Agency, in: T. Mischel (ed.), The Self. 
Psychological and Philosophical Issues, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1977; also in: C. 
Taylor, Human Agency and Language, Philosophical Papers 1, Cambridge UP, 
Cambridge 1985, pp. 16—44. 
 
Kri`an, M., Communitarianism, Charles Taylor, and..., Politi~ka misao, Vol. XXXIV, (1997), No. 5, pp. 152—170 159 
                                                                                                                                              
but she also defines her own moral position. She makes it clear that, in 
her eyes, she herself should be a helpful and noble person, and if she 
acts otherwise, she may legitimately be criticized because of inconsistency. 
Consequently, a person abstaining from strong evaluations cannot be con-
sidered a person with a clearly defined and stable character and morality. 
 Due to the strong evaluations, l. e. the possibility to evaluate evalua-
tions, persons are considered to be responsible not only for their actions, 
but also for their evaluations of actions and, in the last analysis, for their 
personal character and morality. 
 The constitution of one's own moral map as a system of strong 
evaluations is synonymous with defining one's own °identity. Taylor insists 
that personal identity cannot be understood as a set of given, more or 
less alterable properties such as origin, native language, capabilities etc. 
These become relevant elements of a person's identity only after they have 
been included into the individual's system of strong evaluations. Such self-
definition is possible due to the modern concept of positive liberty, i.e. 
the ability to control one's own life, including not only the ability for po-
litical participation, but also the ability for self-realization13. 
 The moral ideal of sincerity towards oneself and the corresponding self 
fulfilment Taylor calls °authenticity. Obviously, the construction of one's 
moral map based on sincere strong evaluations and the consequent striving 
for self-fulfilment on the base of this identity construction, have to be 
considered as authentic. 
 However, in the modern western world the ideals of sincerity and self-
fulfilment are often given an egoistic and relativistic interpretation. By in-
voking moral relativism, people grant priority to their first order desires 
and brush aside the rather difficult task of building a strong moral iden-
tity based on coherent strong evaluations. A case in point is accepting the 
actions and the way of life of a person as morally legitimate simply be-
cause they are sincerely desired, i.e. result from that person's striving for 
self-fulfilment. By such stunted morality many people not only sever their 
social ties, but also lose orientation, become conformist and susceptible to 
manipulation by mass media, exotic sects, etc. 
 This misinterpretation of identity and authenticity can be avoided by 
rejecting moral relativism and recognizing the relevance of meaningful 
moral argumentation. This reestablishes the priority of a coherent moral 
map of strong evaluations, embedded in the semiotic structures of one's 
community. Self-fulfilment understood as authentic manifestation of one's 
identity is then nothing but acting and living in accordance with this 
 
 13Op. cit; C. Taylor, What's wrong with Negative Liberty, in: A. Ryan (ed.), 
The Idea of Freedom. Essays in Honour of Sir Isaiah Berlin, Oxford UP, Oxford 
1979, pp. 175—193; also in: C. T., Philosophy and the Human Sciences. 
Philosophical Papers 2, op. cit., pp. 211—229. 
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moral map14. “Only if I exist in a world in which history, or the demands 
of nature, or the needs of my fellow human beings, or the duties of 
citizenship, or the call of God, or something else of this order matters 
crucially, can I define an identity for myself that is not trivial. Authenticity 
is not the enemy of demands that emanate from beyond the self; it 
supposes such demands”15. 
 f. Thus, identity and authenticity of a person depend on her/his crea-
tivity and expressivity, but also on her/his comprehensive moral map of 
strong evaluations. Young people can develop such moral maps only by 
enculturation into their communities. Adults are supposed to be capable of 
autonomous and competent moral judgement and, consequently, of modi-
fications of their moral maps. However, these modifications can be only 
gradual, because otherwise both the identity and the communal affiliation 
of the person would be jeopardized.  
 On the individual level, the gradualness of modifications is ensured by 
the requirements of coherence and continuity of the personal identity. 
Communal affiliation adds the requirement that the modifications be mor-
ally, acceptable to the community. 
 If further facts are taken into account — that the best way of defining 
and developing an authentic personal identity is by interacting with other 
members of one's community, that membership in a community extends 
the personal moral map to a number of irreducibly social goods, etc., it 
becomes obvious that the authentic identity of a person is inseparable 
from her communal affiliation. Because of this, the largest part of the 
identity of a person is hardly ever at disposal16. “If authenticity is being 
true to ourselves, ..., then perhaps we can only achieve it integrally if we 
recognize that this sentiment connects us to a wider whole”.17 
 g. The above arguments clearly demonstrate that it is a vested interest 
of most individuals and of all societies to foster the communal bonds 
 
 14Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, Harvard UP, Cambridge Mass. 
1991, passim; Charles Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity, Anansi Press, Concord, 
Ontario 1991. 
 15Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, op. cit., pp. 40—41. 
 16It follows that personal identities cannot be construed as a system of 
voluntary radical choices (Sartre), because such choices would threaten the 
coherence, long term stability, and continuity of the personal moral map. Therefore 
Taylor considers the (Sartrean) agents of radical choices as persons without 
identity. What is at disposition cannot be part of one's identity. The final result of 
the process of objectification of all personal needs, desires, weak and strong 
evaluations is a situation in which everything can be chosen, but there are no 
value criteria for those choices. The radically “unencumbered self” floats in the 
total axiological vacuum, i.e. is no self at all. 
 17Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, op. cit., p. 91. 
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among their members. All communities compatible with the constitution of 
the society can, and probably should be supported. After all, belonging to 
a community is a sine Qua non not only of a relevant identity and 
authenticity, but of the very morality and dignity of man: “(W)hat man 
derives from society is not some aid in realizing his good, but the very 
possibility of being an agent seeking that good. ... (S)ocial views see some 
form of society as essentially bound up with human dignity, since outside 
of society the very potentiality to realize that wherein this dignity consists 
is undermined; whereas atomist views see human dignity as quite inde-
pendent of society...”18. 
 h. As a rule, modern societies are composed of several culturally dif-
ferent communities. There are two main reasons for this: First, the world 
consists of thousands of communities upholding different cultural traditions. 
Migrations and changes of political borders have resulted in cultural het-
erogeneity of most existing states. Second, liberalism, in particular its far-
reaching individual and group rights, is highly conducive to the develop-
ment of new communities, based on new ideologies, religions, world-views 
and other comprehensive doctrines. Therefore modern liberal-democratic 
societies have to be considered communities of communities. 
 This cultural plurality (multiculturality) renders the task of keeping the 
society together more difficult: “(T)he stronger the communities, the less 
they are inclined to see themselves as, and to act as, members of a more 
encompassing whole”19. Amitai Etzioni therefore argues that procedural 
rules are not a sufficiently solid framework of society. That framework has 
to include some substantive core values — but not a rigid comprehensive 
doctrinal canon — to enable the social order to sustain itself. He 
proposes the following elements of that framework20: 
 (i) A more-than-procedural commitment to democracy is necessary be-
cause if democracy is viewed as merely an instrument, it may be aban-
doned when a big social group finds its instrumental value waning. 
 (ii) Commitment to the constitution and human rights is necessary be-
cause they draw the borders and fix mutual relationships between the 
spheres of responsibility of single communities and the overarching socie-
ty/state. From the perspective of human rights, this border is, grosso modo 
congruent with the border between matters subject to majority rule and 
those protected by the unalienable individual and group rights. 
 
 18Charles Taylor, The Nature and Scope of Distributive Justice in: C. Taylor, 
Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Philosophical Papers 2, op. cit., pp. 289—317, 
p. 292.  
 19Amitai Etzioni, “The Community of Communities, The Responsive Community, 
Vol. 7, No. 1, Winter 1996/97, pp. 21—32, p. 21. 
 20Op. cit., p. 25—32. 
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 (iii) Because the overarching society/state also claims substantial loyalty, 
layered or split loyalties of the citizens are necessary. Each citizen has to 
be loyal both to her/his particular communities, and to the liberal-demo-
cratic constitution keeping the society together. 
 (iv) The respect for difference is necessary as the principal condition of 
peaceful coexistence of different communities. In a way, this respect is 
implied in the loyalty of all citizens to the common liberal-democratic 
constitution. However, tolerance does not exclude moral refusal of the 
views and values tolerated. On the contrary, “(r)espect means that while 
these are not values I hold, I have no normative objections to others 
holding them”21. “Civility” is another word for the readiness to accept di-
versity, respect autonomy, and peacefully resolve conflicts. 
 (v) Limiting  identity politics is necessary because, first, the escalating 
claims of different communities to state subsidies and support intensifies 
the competition among them, and second, these subsidies may increase the 
cultural differences and incompatibilities. 
 (vi) Society-wide dialogues are the right antidote against competition 
and growing incompatibilities. 
 (vii) Finally, a means for the reconciliation of individuals who have 
harmed the community has to be conceived and institutionalized, i.e. some 
sort of jurisdiction taking into account both the common constitution and 
laws, and the particularities of single communities. 
 (viii) The last (vii) core value points beyond Etzioni’s list to social 'L 
slice as a foundation of community. Philip Selznick22 accentuates four basic 
principles of social justice and morality of community: equality, mutuality, 
stewardship, and inclusion. Equality guarantees the dignity of al) individuals 
as moral persons, thus synthetizing Biblical and Enlightenment thought. It 
requires that everyone's needs for life, health, liberty, and hope are re-
spected and addressed. Mutuality refers to the communal bonds of interde-
pendence, reciprocity, sharing, trust, good faith, reliance, and commonality. 
It does not exclude self-interest, but creates the moral infrastructure of 
cooperation. “Stewardship is the exercise of comprehensive and dedicated 
responsibility for a valued practice, institution, resource, relationship, or 
group”, thus binding social power to moral ideals beyond equality and 
mutuality23. Finally, the principle of inclusion requires balancing the 
 
 21Op. cit, p. 31. Unfortunately, this definition of “respect” does not solve the 
problem of value pluralism. It either implies moral relativism, or a systematic 
abstention from normative discussions with adherents of different values, moral 
maps, comprehensive doctrines etc. Such an abstention is difficult to justify, 
especially in view of the requirement (no. vi) of society-wide dialogues. 
 22Philip Selznick, Social Justice: A Communitarian Perspective, The Responsive 
Community, Vol. 6, No. 4, Fall 1996, pp. 13—25. 
 23Op. cit., p. 22 
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universalistic norms of human rights, tolerance, equality, and legality, and 
of particularistic attachments to family, locality, religion, language, and 
tradition. After all, particular attachments often help preserve the more 
universalistic political societies as communities of communities. 
 Charles Taylor comments on the problem of justice in a community of 
communities with the following words: “It may be argued that in certain 
cases the community within which we sustain our sense of liberty, person-
ality, individuality is smaller than our political society. ... It might be ar-
gued that more intense or culturally vital relations of a local community 
give rise to more far-reaching obligations of distributive justice. For in-
stance, the level of equality one can demand might be more far-reaching 
within a local community than between such communities. 
 What all this means is that we have to abandon the search for a sin-
gle set of principles of distributive justice. ... So that we may have to 
think both of justice between individuals, as well as between communities, 
and also perhaps within communities”24. 
 
 7) The idea of modern political societies, understood as communities of 
communities, has far-reaching implications concernina the idea of civil so-
ciety: 
 a. By interpolation of the level of communities and associations be-
tween the state/society and individual citizens (and micro-communities such 
as families), unmediated interactions between citizens and state become 
more difficult and less frequent. The communities absorb a considerable 
part of the political energy of the citizens, which would otherwise be 
spent on the state level. On the other hand, they also absorb part of the 
pressure that the state would otherwise exert upon its atomized citizens. 
The result of this absorption is the reduced immediate impact of citizen 
activities upon the common state/society, and the relative protection of the 
citizens within their communities against coercive interventions of the state. 
 A fragmented and thus weakened civil society increases the proneness 
of the state to develop in the direction of a paternalistic, soft despotism, 
and the tendency of the citizens to become politically passive private con-
sumers, finding the sense of their lives in families, local communities, re-
ligious groups etc. 
 However, there are also opposing tendencies and mechanisms: strong 
associations and a richly textured civil society may check governmental 
power, and citizens active in their associations and communities may use 
the acquired political skills in the institutions of state/society. 
 
 24Charles Taylor, The Nature and Scope of Distributive Justice, in: C. Taylor, 
Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Philosophical Papers 2, op. cit., pp. 289—317, 
p. 312. 
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 b. Associations and communities can gradually integrate into the institu-
tional structures of the state/society, thus constituting a corporatist state. 
Such a state favors the developments described in a. above. 
 c. Charles Taylor distinguishes three types of civil society depending on 
their ability to influence the government: (l) Civil society as a set of free 
associations and communities independent of state power, but unable to 
influence it. (ii) Civil society enabled by the interactions of the associa-
tions and communities to structure itself and coordinate its activities. (iii) 
Civil society able to significantly influence the government policies by its 
coordinated activities25. Only the last type of civil society, the one able to 
influence the government policies, can secure the conditions of its own 
existence: legality, the satisfaction of basic needs etc. 
 d. One of the necessary conditions of an effective civil society is an 
independent public sphere. In the public sphere the citizens articulate their 
political opinions and expectations, presuming that these expectations will 
be served by the democratically elected political authorities. Therefore, a 
public sphere free of all idelogical prejudications is of utmost importance 
as a school of public deliberation, discussion, and formulation of a broadly 
accepted consensus. 
 Obviously, in a culturally plural society the public sphere must be open 
to the cultural particularities of the various communities, and not limited 
only to the topics of “general” or “common” interest, i.e. those belonging 
to the sphere of Rawls's “overlapping consensus”. It has to be the locus 
of public deliberations among the different cultural communities and of 
their mutual quest for respect and recognition26. 
 Due to its freedom, the public sphere transcends the limits of local 
communities, associations, religious groups, and even the state borders, and 
thus contributes decisively to the constitution of an encompassing solidarity 
of the whole humanity. Its ultimate goal is to tame political power by 
reasoning on all levels of the community of communities27. 
 Notwithstanding its universalistic potentiality, the public sphere should 
not be centralized, i.e. reduced to a small number of mass media imper-
vious to local inputs. Also necessary are smaller, local public spheres 
 
 25Charles Taylor, Invoking Civil Society, in: C. Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, 
Harvard UP, Cambridge Mass. 1995, pp. 204—224, p. 208. 
 26Cf. Yael Tamir, The Land of the Fearful and the Free, Constellations, Vol. 
3, No. 3, Jan. 1997, pp. 296—314, pp. 305—312. 
 27Charles Taylor, op. cit., p. 216—220; idem, Liberal Politics and the Public 
Sphere, in: idem, Philosophical Arguments, op. cit., pp. 257—287, passim. 
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nested within the larger ones, opening the doors of the latter for local 
concerns28. 
 e. The common public sphere is the institution within which the society 
as a whole can formulate some common objectives and mobilize the nec-
essary political forces to realize them, possibly against the resistance or 
inertia of the Leviathan state. Such periodical common political mobiliza-
tion is necessary to prevent the fragmentation of society, i.e. its loss of 
character of a community of communities. 
 f. The type of associations of civil society most suitable for mass po-
litical mobilization are not the bureaucratized political parties, but “single 
objective organizations” or “advocacy movements”29. 
 g. On the other hand, beyond the political sphere, comprehensive ethi-
cal, religious, philosophical and other doctrines offer the best orientation 
to the citizens in their daily practice. As a rule, these doctrines claim 
universal validity of their central tenets. In other words, their adherents 
strive for broad recognition and positive evaluation of these tenets not as 
cultural particularities, but as doctrinal elements legitimately claiming uni-
versal validity. 
 h. The claim of universality points to the risks of the politics known as 
“politics of difference” or “politics of recognition”, addressing the various 
cultural communities30. The objective of this politics is prima facie a 
universalist one: Every community whose doctrine does not contradict the 
constitutional essentials should be adequately respected and recognized, i.e. 
its cultural and doctrinal particularities should be accepted and positively 
valued. 
 However, the politics of recognition runs the risk of failure because of 
some intrinsic contradictions. First, by granting recognition to in some 
cases incompatible doctrines, values etc., it undermines the universalist im-
petus of the constitution and tendentiously narrows the “overlapping con-
sensus” (Rawls). Second, it may thus stir conflicts between communities. 
Third, by insisting vn the particularity of these doctrines, it hardly satisfies 
their adherents, convinced of their universal validity. And fourth, the an-
swer to the legitimate question of who grants recognition to whom may 
be that it is western liberals recognizing non-European cultures, suggesting 
the ethnocentrism of the whole idea. 
 
 28Op. cit., pp. 279—280. 
 29Ibidem, p. 286. 
 30Cf. Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in: Amy Gutmann (ed.), 
Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition”, Princeton UP, Princeton 1992; 
and in: C. Taylor, Philosophical Arguments op. cit., pp. 225—256; Linda Nicholson, 
To be or not to be: Charles Taylor and the Politics of Recognition, Constellations, 
Vol. 3, No. 1, April 1996, pp. 1—16. 
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 i. These risks can porobably be reduced by accepting the following 
principles: (1) All cultures are recognized as being potentially equally valu-
able, as containing potentially attractive conceptions of the good, to be 
discovered by learning more about these cultures. (2) It is accepted that 
some cultures contain universalist ideas and legitimately claim universality. 
(3) Intercultural dialogue is highly valued. (4) The priority of discussing 
the ideas claiming universality is accepted31. (5) The necessity of maximal 
flexibilization of all comprehensive doctrines and universalist ideas in order 
to facilitate dialogue and compromise is recognized. In other words, the 
universalist doctrines should have blurred edges. 
 These principles offer the basis for a permanent public deliberation 
about the universalist claims of the involved doctrines, their areas of over-
lapping, areas of doctrinal conflict, ways toward compromise and consensus, 
methods of avoiding political conflicts and disintegration of society etc. 
Such openness to compromise does not threaten the liberal-democratic 
constitutions. It was modern liberalism that put the topic of multiculturality 
on its agenda, and the ongoing discussion of this topic confirms its 
undiminished vitality. But it has to accept the possibility of far-reaching 
changes32. 
 Obviously, the growing mutual familiarity of different cultures necessarily 
results in modifications of their value systems and, consequently, of the 
character and extension of their mutual recognition and respect. In order 
to respect someone, he has to be known not from theoretical distance, 
but through communication. And communication implies some common 
ground, which may be the result of former communication. This is the 
circulus virtuosos which has to be put in motion to counteract the cen-
trifugal forces in any plural society. 
 j. Stable and solidary communities and associations promote the selfre-
liance and responsibility of the citizens. They learn to be active out of 
their inner motivations and to rely on their fellow-citizens. In contrast, at-
omized individuals often feel helpless and need a strong state to lean on. 
 
 
 31This contradicts the conviction that the best way of approaching an unknown, 
alien culture is to look first at the differences from one's own culture. It is 
proposed, on the contrary, that the interest in, openness toward and dialogue with 
the alien culture should be based primarily on the universalist claims on both 
sides. Such unversalistically oriented dialogue is most likely to extend the area of 
overlapping of the two cultures. 
 32Cf. Linda Nicholson, op. cit.. In Nicholson's own words: “These more 
challenging voices are not those saying “recognize my worth” but rather those 
saying, “let my presence make you aware of the limitations of what you have so 
far judged to be true and of worth” (p. 10). 
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 8) Based on the idea of civil society as depicted above, the question 
about the optimum type of civil society for the postcommunist countries in 
Europe should be tackled. In Central Europe, the idea of civil society was 
used to delegitimize Soviet communism and imperialism in favor of local 
interests more than one decade before its collapse33. After all, the in-
tention of social theory is not to describe the structure and the self-un-
derstanding of existing societies, but to change them34. The following the-
ses seem to be of central importance for this topic: 
 a. Due to the lack of civic traditions and the decades of totalitarian 
rule, the members of postcommunist societies lack the civic political cul-
ture necessary for the establishment of an autonomous, vigorous and ef-
fective civil society. If the elected political leaders possess such culture, 
they usually play the role of paragons in the process of the development 
of civic culture of the population. If they don't, the tendencies towards 
autocratic rule are to be expected, retarding the development of civil soci-
ety35. Another factor may also impede the development of the civic politi-
cal culture and the civil society: the unavoidable and far-reaching interven-
tions of the state in society and economy during the process of postcom-
munist transition. 
 b. In order to avoid the trap of ethnic nationalism, all political forces 
political parties, movements, NGOs, citizen associations, local councils, and 
the state — should engage in the promotion of a broad spectrum of 
communities and associations of citizens, primarily the following ones: 
 (i) Communities formed around some irreducibly social goods, for in-
stance particular traditions, religious doctrines, but also ideological, ethical 
and even philosophical ones, can play a crucial role in the formation and 
stabilization of new, postcommunist identities of citizens, and thus deci-
sively reduce the dangers resulting from the postcommunist anomie. 
 (ii) Political parties, professional associations, trade-unions, NGOs, 
neighborhoods, councils of city quarters and cities, regional councils etc., 
can motivate citizens to become self-confident and active participants in 
social and political life. They can, first, help citizens to overcome their 
deeply inculcated fear of state power and coercion. Second, they can 
check the autocratic tendencies of the state, either as independent organi-
zations, or as organizations included in the corporatist structure of the 
state. Third, they can play a decisive role in the implementation of the 
 
 33Cf. Charles Taylor, Invoking Civil Society, op. cit., p. 204. 
 34Charles Taylor, Social Theory as Practice, op. cit. 
 35Well-known positive models for the respective populations are Lech Valesa in 
Poland and Vaclav Havel in the Czech Republic. Examples of autocratic rulers 
abusing the lack of civic culture in the population are Franjo Tu|man of Croatia 
and Slobodan Milo{evi} of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
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necessary reforms in the society and the economy. These associations and 
organizations can, but do not have to, be based on irreducibly social 
goods; it suffices that they are based on convergent individual goods and 
interests. 
 (iii) Enlarged and solidary families offer to their members two kinds of 
support: First, many people consider the solidarity based on kinship, i.e. 
biological bonds, to be more reliable than that based on ideological bonds. 
Second, in a situation of rapid social transformation and instability, the 
family appears as the last foothold. And third, cultural traditions as bases 
of larger communities, are perpetuated in the form of families36. 
 c. Since in modern plural societies many different communities or asso-
ciations coexist, criteria of priority concerning promotion are necessary. 
Having in mind the existing experiences with postcommunism, groups with 
following qualities should be given priority: 
 (i) The group is constituted around a clearly defined common objective, 
purpose or social good. 
 (ii) The cohesion of the group does not depend on the charisma of a 
leader, but on the attraction of that objective or good. 
 (iii) Individual liberty, autonomy, and civic culture are highly valued. 
(iv) Especially highly valued is the free communication within the group 
(local public sphere). 
 (v) The relationships within the group are democratic. 
 (vi) The ideology and activities of the group strengthen the individual 
responsibility of its members towards the group, and the responsibility of 
the group towards the rest of the society. Group members learn to be 
active out of their inner motivations, and to count on the help from their 
colleagues37.  
 
 36The importance of enlarged families in situations of social turmoil, weakened 
institutions, instability, and sudden change of social environment, is well illustrated 
by the case of migrants. In their new, alien environment, they are thrown upon 
their families and, eventually, the already existing local group of migrants of similar 
cultural background. A stable familiar environment furnishes the migrants with the 
security and self-confidence necessary for successfully coping with the new 
environment. Well-known examples of such role of families are the Asian 
immigrants to the USA and the Turkish immigrants to Germany. 
 37“Personal responsibility is most likely to flourish when there is genuine 
opportunity to participate in communal life”, Philip Selznick, Social Justice: A 
Communitarian Perspective, op. cit., p. 14. 
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 Self-reliant and responsible associated citizens are the antidote to the 
heteronomous subjects dependent on the mercy of the state, the standard 
products of communist totalitarianism and paternalism38. 
 (vii) The education of children and young people, including civic educa-
tion, has high priority. Learning to share a commitment to a common 
goal or purpose of the group, and to work collectively on its realization, 
is important not only for the prosperity of the group, but also for the 
society as a whole, for the community of communities. 
 d. Of course, in postcommunist societies there is also the danger that 
the various communities and associations, after their consolidation, attract 
most of the citizens’ public energy, thus preventing the constitution of an 
effective civil society, the democratic “body politic” to be able to counter-
balance the autocratic tendencies of the state. 
 The best foundation of a coherent and effective civil society are irre-
ducibly social goods that can be secured only on the level of the common 
state. The following irreducibly social goods can prevent both ethnic na-
tionalism and the fragmentation of civil society: 
 (i) A liberal and democratic constitution has to guarantee the basic 
rights to all citizens. The principle of equality demands that there are no 
groups with special status, such as members of a vanguard party, a nobil-
ity of office (German “Beamte”), ethnic minorities realizing their true 
“statehood” in their own — possibly nonexistent — ethnic states, immi-
grants with infringed rights etc. Only as equals can free citizens constitute 
a “we” including all of them and thus guarantee to each other the basic 
rights enabling them to peacefully live and act within their particular asso-
ciations and communities. 
 (ii) Similar is the role of legality. Although laws can be understood as 
goods resulting primarily from the convergence of individual interests, they 
are also irreducibly social goods. 
 (iii) A free public sphere on the level of the community of communi-
ties enables the members of all communities and associations to formulate 
common interests, thus exerting some control over political processes and 
 
 38The lack of responsible and self-reliant citizens on the Balkans has led, during 
and after the Third Balkan war, to an absurd situation: The newly discovered 
ethnic identities and the new “sovereign and internationally recognized”, more or 
less “ethnically cleansed” states are cherished more than anything else. On the 
other hand, all the necessary aid for postvar reconstruction is expected to come 
from abroad, while at the same time the “international community” is made 
responsible for not stopping the war, for its ravages, and for its outcome. In other 
words, someone else is responsible for the whole disaster, and has to pay for its 
consequences. 
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constituting the common identity, securing the long term stability of the 
state39. 
 (iv) Modern welfare states legitimize themselves by providing a number 
of social services to their citizens. The most important of these services 
have the character of insurances (e. g. health, unemployment, pension in-
surance). Welfare institutions therefore appear to be primarily the results 
of convergence of individual interests. Nonetheless, they foster the solidar-
ity of civil society. All the more so in post-communism, after the corre-
sponding communist institutions have collapsed. 
 
 9) Finally, the question arises who, and by what methods, has the duty 
to promote a communitarian civil socieity in postcommunist countries. The 
answer: all and everyone who can! 
 
Translated by the author 
 
 
 39In the post-Yugoslav states the public sphere has to fulfil another important 
function: The ideology and the — rather crooked — practice of self-management 
at the work place, and social selfgovernment as an extension of self-management 
over the whole society, have left some traces in the political consciousness of the 
Yugoslav population. Since selfmanagement in privatized firms is not possible, and 
the political democracy is still in its years of apprenticeship, a functioning public 
sphere is probably the most appropriate substitute for the social self-government 
and the best antidote against the mafia-structures emerging in many spheres not 
yet permeated by the legal power and institutions of the state. Thereby, local 
public spheres may be of primary importance. 
